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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code 
Ann. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
A. Issues Presented. 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the claims of Miller? 
2. Did the trial err in ruling that the State is entitled to recover from the 
bonding company the full amount on the bond by virtue of the Spa's failure to refund the 
unused portion of membership fees to all members holding valid, unexpired membership 
contracts with Quest at the time of the closure of the spa? 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that Rule 152-7-4.F of the Utah 
Administrative Code is not imposed upon Salt Lake County an obligation to honor the 
membership contracts of the Spa in effect at the time of the purchase of the facility on 
June 15, 1995 as is the memorandum decision? 
B. Standard of Review. 
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, and not as a matter of fact, that the claims 
of Miller should be dismissed and that County had no obligation to honor the 
membership contracts at the time of the purchase of the spa facility by the County. 
Questions of law are reviewed by this Court for correctness. No particular deference is to 
be given to an agency's, or lower court's statutory interpretation. See, Lunnen v. Utah 
Dept. of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App.1994); State v. Larson, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 
1993); Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Com 'n of State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant statutes are: 
1. The Health Spa Services Protection Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-23-1 et seq. 
(1991). (Addendum 1). 
2. Utah Admin. Rule 152-7-2 et seq. (1990). (Addendum 2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The original action relevant to this matter was brought by the State of Utah, by 
and through the Division of Consumer Protection, (hereinafter the "Division" or the 
"State") against Boyd. L. Jentzsch dba Quest Sport and Fitness, Homestead Insurance 
Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation and International Special Events & Recreation 
Association, a risk retention purchasing group. This action was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court under Civil No. 950906098AA. In this initial action, the State sought to 
recover from the Defendants the sum of $50,000.00, representing the amount of the bond 
placed by Mr. Jentzsch in accordance with the Health Spa Protection Services Act 
(hereinafter the "Act"). 
A subsequent action was filed by the Appellant, David W. Miller (hereinafter 
"Miller"), against the State of Utah by and through the Division of Consumer Protection 
and Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah. This action was filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court under Civil No. 950906977CV. This action was 
subsequently consolidated with the prior matter. In this companion action, Miller, as the 
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guarantor of the bond posted by Jentzsch, sought to require the State of Utah to enforce 
its rules and to require Salt Lake County, as the purchaser of a spa facility, to honor and 
recognize the unexpired membership contracts outstanding at the time Salt Lake County 
purchased the Quest Sport & Fitness spa facility. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The appeal is taken from the Memorandum Decision and Summary Judgment 
entered in this matter on June 2, 1997 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Ann M. Stirba presiding. 
Oral Argument on the cross motions of the parties for summary judgment was 
held before the District Court on April 10, 1997. At that time, the court entered an oral 
judgment granting the motions for summary judgment of the Appellee's, State of Utah 
and Salt Lake County and denying the motion for summary judgment of the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Miller. Thereafter, a proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment were filed by the State and the County. A timely objection was filed by 
Appellant. Pursuant to the objections, the order of the court was amended and an 
appropriate order entitled "Memorandum Decision and Summary Judgment" was entered 
by the court on June 2, 1997. 
The ruling of the trial court was that the rules of the state of Utah did not apply to 
Salt Lake County and that Salt Lake County had, therefore, no obligation to honor the 
unexpired contracts. The effect of this ruling is to require the bond to be paid, which will, 
in turn, require that Miller pay the bonding company. A Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed by Miller as to the trial court's ruling. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
Prior to the filing of these actions, a health spa facility, known as Quest Sport & 
Fitness (hereinafter the "Spa") was being operated in Salt Lake County by Boyd L. 
Jentzsch. (R. 182). In accordance with the Utah Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"), 
Mr. Jentzsch, in order to operate the spa facility was required to post a $50,000.00 bond. 
On or about September 21, 1994, Mr. Jentzsch submitted to the State of Utah the 
necessary and appropriate bond that had been obtained through the personal guarantee of 
Miller. (R.183). The spa facility was located at approximately 10300 South Redwood 
Road, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Jentzsch operated the facility until approximately January 
3, 1995, at which time Mr. Jentzsch closed the facility due to financial difficulties, which 
had resulted in the filing of a bankruptcy. (R. 184). 
The method of operation followed by Mr. Jentzsch was typical of other spa 
facility operations. The Spa had sold to members of the public membership contracts of 
varying lengths, not exceeding three (3) years. In fact, the majority of the contracts are in 
the 1 to 2 year range. 
The actual facility, itself, was not owned by Mr. Jentzsch. In fact, the facility was 
owned by an entity known as the "Country Courthouse Trust" and was leased to Mr. 
Jentzsch for the purposes of operating the spa facility. (R.183). The building was built 
originally for the purposes of operating a spa facility. It is, for all intents and purposes, a 
specialty use building with no other practical purpose. 
Upon the closing of the facility, efforts were made both by Mr. Jentzsch, as well 
as others, to sell the facility to another entity who would operate the same as a spa. 
Ultimately, the spa facility was purchased by Salt Lake County (the "County"), who 
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immediately reopened the same as a health and fitness center. However, the County 
refused to honor the outstanding and unexpired membership contracts held by members 
of the public to the spa facility. The State of Utah determined that the balance due on the 
unexpired contracts was in excess of $50,000.00 and called the bond. 
The State of Utah, by and through the Division of Consumer Protection, has 
promulgated various rules that are to be used in connection with the application of the 
Act. One of those rules, Rule 152-7-4.F (Addendum 2) specifically provides that the 
purchaser of a health spa facility shall be obligated to honor the unexpired membership 
contracts held by the public. If Salt Lake County, as the new purchaser of the facility, had 
been required to honor the provisions of this Rule, there would be no need to call upon 
the bond which has been given by Mr. Jentzsch and guaranteed by Appellant Miller. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court, pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, refused to impose the 
obligations of the Rules on the County. The trial court specifically held that the Rule was 
invalid on the theory that the Rule was inconsistent with the Act and went beyond the 
scope of the Act. (R.441-49). 
The position of Miller is that the Rule is not inconsistent with, nor beyond the 
scope of, the Act and that the Rule should be applied to the County's operation of the spa 
facility in the same manner that the Rule would be applied to a private owner's operation 
of the spa facility. Miller does not deny that the Act specifically exempts the operation of 
a spa facility by a government agency. However, the exemption given by the Act goes 
solely to the requirement of a government entity to post a bond. Releasing governmental 
agencies from posting bonds is a common, and well-understood, fact of life. It is 
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grounded on the theory that the government, having unlimited resources, can stand any 
liability or damages which arise from its own misconduct. 
However, there is no exemption in the Act from the other protections that the Act 
affords. The State of Utah, by and through the Division of Consumer Protection, has 
enumerated the protections of the Act in its rules. While a government entity may not 
have to post a bond, it should be required to afford the public the other protections of the 
Act, including the protection that unexpired membership contracts will be honored by the 
purchaser of a spa facility. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Rule 152-7-4.F could not, and did not, apply to 
the County. The trial court interpreted the Act to mean that a private owner or operator of 
a health spa facility should give all the protections which the Act and the rules afford; but 
that a governmental entity, as an owner or operator, need give none of those protections. 
The trial court should have upheld the rule as not being inconsistent with the Act, nor 
beyond its terms or scope. The trial court should have ordered the County to assume the 
unexpired membership contracts of the prior operator of the same facility. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INVALIDATING RULE 152-7-4.F 
Unlike most appeals of summary judgment rulings, Miller does not deny that the 
facts of this case are undisputed. No one denies that the Quest Sport & Fitness spa 
facility closed leaving unexpired membership contracts that were being held by members 
of the public. It is not disputed that Salt Lake County, shortly thereafter, purchased that 
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same facility from its owner and thereafter operated the spa facility virtually identical to 
the one operated by Mr. Jentzsch. 
Further, there is no dispute that the Act requires private operators of health spa 
facilities to post a bond. The clear intent of the bond requirement is to insure that if the 
facility closes and never reopens, those members of the public having unexpired 
membership contracts will get their money back. Miller does not debate the fact that the 
Act does not require governmental operators of health spa facilities to post a similar 
bond. 
There is likewise no dispute in this case that the Division had the authority to 
make rules that would give full effect to the Act. The clear purposes of the Act are to 
protect the consuming public from operators of health spa facilities who simply close the 
facility leaving members of the public with unexpired, paid membership contracts and no 
place to use them. The purpose of the enactment of rules of the Division is to maximize 
the protection of the Act for the benefit of the public. 
In essence, the trial court has unnecessarily invalidated a Rule on the premise that 
it imposes a responsibility on the government that the Act did not impose. In so doing, 
the trial court has violated a number of rules of statutory construction and appellate 
review. 
It is recognized that rules promulgated by an agency are clothed with a 
presumption of validity and cannot be ignored. An agency is held to the rules that it 
makes, unless there is some compelling reason for noncompliance. See State, Etc v. 
Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980). 
It is also well established that a reviewing court is to review an agency's own 
application of its rules for reasonableness and rationality. See Lunnen v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1994); Union Pacific R. v. 
Auditing D/v., 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
In addition, statutes are to be construed by the court liberally and with a view to 
effecting their objectives and avoiding injustice. Brickyard Homeowners Ass *n v. 
Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983). When construing statutes, it is well 
known that legislative intent is to be given full enforcement in such a way as to avoid 
unlikely, strained or absurd results. See State v. Landrum, 832 P.2d 1359 (Wash. App. 
1992). 
Finally, statutory interpretations are questions of law to which a "correction of 
error" standard is to applied. No particular deference is to be given to an agency's (or 
lower court's) interpretation. See Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Com 'n of 
State of Utah, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
Each of the above-stated principles was not followed by the court below, resulting 
in a strained interpretation of the Act, an uneven application of the Rule and an injustice 
to the Appellant. The trial court did not need to find that the Rule was inapplicable to 
government-owned spa facilities for the simple reason that the Rule does not conflict with 
the Act itself. 
The trial court ruled that since the Act did not impose a bonding requirement on 
government operators of spa facilities, the rules promulgated by the Division, likewise, do 
not apply to government operators of spa facilities. The effect of the trial court's ruling 
was to say that none of the protections given by the Act and by the rules apply to 
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government-operated spa facilities. The result is that the consuming public is protected if 
the operator of the spa is a private owner but has no protections if the operator of the 
facility is the government. 
It is clear that the legislature intended a spa operated by the government to be 
exempt only from the bonding requirements of the Act, but not from the other protections 
of Act, as defined by the rules of the Division. The legislature saw no reason to require 
the government to post a bond, given the almost unlimited resources and abilities of the 
government. The theory, in this context, is that if the government closed a facility with 
unexpired membership contracts, the government would have sufficient resources to 
insure that the members of the public holding such contracts would get their money back. 
In other areas, the government is routinely exempted from the requirement to post 
a bond. Examples of this are such things as prejudgment writs, injunctions and appeals. 
In such situations, it is presumed that the government, having its resources and abilities, 
will be able to cover any eventual damages assessed. Accordingly, the Act gives a similar 
exemption from the filing of a bond to a health spa operated by the government. 
However, it is absurd to argue that being exempted from the requirements of a 
bond also exempts the government from giving the other protections that the Act and the 
Rule clearly intended to provide. If the Act, and the rules promulgated by the Division, 
grant to the consumer the further protection that a purchase of a health spa facility will 
honor an unexpired contract, that same protection should be afforded to the consumer 
when the government is the purchaser. Otherwise, the consumer is actually damaged 
when the government is the purchaser of the facility. 
Rule 152-7-2 specifically declares: 
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These rules shall apply to the conduct of every health spa business within 
the state of Utah. 
In addition, the rules of the Division are careful to note that included within the coverage 
of the rules are both "health spa businesses" and "health spa facilities." Rule 152-7-3.F is 
careful to define a "health spa business" as "the business of buying, operating and selling 
health spa facilities and shall include all acts related thereto." At the same time, the Rule 
defines a health spa facility entirely differently. Rule 152-7-3.G defines a "health spa 
facility" as "the physical facility at which the services of health spa business are provided 
to its members." Thus, the rules are intended to cover not only the sale of the business 
but also the sale of the physical facilities themselves. 
The specific rule invalidated by the trial court was Rl 52-7-4.F, which states: 
F. The purchaser of a Health Spa Facility shall replace the Seller as a 
party to any unexpired Membership Contract and shall honor all 
Membership Contracts of the purchased facility in effect at the time of the 
purchase, pursuant to Section 13-23-5(2) of the Act. 
The trial court ruled that this requirement did not apply to government owned facilities 
despite that fact that the Rule states that all operators of spa facilities are to honor the 
unexpired membership contracts relating to that facility. The Rule, quite appropriately, 
does not exempt government owners nor should it give such exemption. 
The trial court did not need to invalidate the Rule because the Act does not require 
the government to post a bond. It could, quite as easily, have appropriately ruled that 
even though the government need not post a bond, if it purchases a spa facility, it must 
honor unexpired contracts. By so doing, the trial court would have granted to the public 
the same protections, whether the purchaser was the government or was a private 
individual. 
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The absurdity of the court's interpretation of the statute and its invalidation of the 
Rule is best illustrated by the effect that the ruling has on the public. The Act was 
specifically passed to give the spa-using public some protection. Before the Act, 
operators of spa facilities would sell multi-year membership contracts, people would pay 
their money, and the next thing the people knew, the spa facility had closed and the 
people had no way to recoup their loss. In response to this problem, the legislature passed 
the Act that has the significant protection of requiring a bond. No one would argue with 
the theory that the government, if it owned a spa, need not put up a bond for two reasons: 
(a) the government has supposedly unlimited resources and would in no way leave the 
innocent consuming public "holding the bag"; and (b) there would be no need to burden 
state resources with the filing of a bond. 
Endowed with rulemaking authority, the Division enacted rules that would give 
full effect to the protections of the Act. The specific rule in question provided that if one 
were to purchase a spa facility, one should be aware that unexpired membership contracts 
become the buyer's responsibility. Thus, the Division no doubt determined, the 
consuming public would be assured of its right to use the very facility for which they had 
an unexpired contract. 
The system was foolproof until Salt Lake County purchased the spa facility 
previously operated by Quest Sport & Fitness. The spa facility had unexpired contracts. 
The spa operator was unable to continue and filed a bankruptcy. The County is charged 
with knowledge of the Rule when it purchased the facility. However, because of the 
ruling of the court below, the County can, in essence, "thumb its nose" at those members 
of the public with unexpired contracts and refuse to honor the same. 
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The simple fact is that if this spa had been purchased by a private business, the 
Division would, in all of its righteous indignation, be insisting that such private business 
honor the unexpired contracts. There is no doubt of this. Such is the clear wording and 
intent of the Rule. However, the Division's interpretation, backed by the trial court's 
ruling, is that not only does the County not have to put up a bond to operate the facility, 
but it need not protect the members of the public with unexpired contracts. In 
otherwords, because of the trial court's ruling, if the spa operator is the County, there are 
no protections whatsoever for the public. In every way, the consumer loses all of the 
protections of the Act when the County is the buyer of the facility. 
This absurdity could easily have been avoided without doing violence to the Act 
or invalidating the Rule. If the Rule in question had stated that a governmentally-owned 
spa facility must put up a bond, despite the clear exemption of the statute, the rule would 
clearly be beyond the bounds of the statute and be invalid. The Rule did no such thing. 
The Rule recognized that the County did not have to put up a bond but saw no harm in 
making all spa facility owners, whether government or otherwise, honor the 
unexpired contracts of the facility members. If the Rule had been upheld by the trial 
court, the statute would be unscathed and the public would be protected to the maximum 
degree intended by the Act, and the rules. 
The first law of legislative interpretation is that the plain language of the statute is 
to be given effect. The Court is not to go outside of that plain language to a strained, 
unlikely or absurd result. By holding the Rule invalid, and not forcing the County to 
comply with it, the trial court came to just such a result. If the trial court had interpreted 
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the statute correctly to the effect that the County was waived of any bond only, the Rule 
could stand and the public could be protected. 
It should not be lost in this argument that by choosing the route of calling the 
bond, the Division will, in essence, return to the public far less than 50% of the public's 
loss. The bond money is not large enough to go around. However, if the Division had 
enforced its Rule with the County-owned spa operator, the consuming public would have 
zero loss. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE RULE WAS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE THE OPERATOR OF THE 
FACILITY WAS NOT THE SELLER OF THE FACILITY 
There is an additional form-over-substance argument made by the Division as the 
basis for dismissing this appeal. It is undisputed that the spa facility, itself, was being 
operated under a lease. Quest Sport & Fitness was the operator and Country Courthouse 
Trust was the owner of the facility. The Division argues, therefore, that the membership 
contracts were with the operator, not the owner, and that the Rule does not apply. This 
argument entirely ignores the great lengths to which the Division went in making sure 
that not only the operator of a health spa business, but also the operator of a health spa 
facility was covered by the Rule. The Division defines "business" separately from 
"facility." The Rule specifically provides that the operator of a facility must honor the 
unexpired contract, not just the operator of the business. 
Again, the Rule was designed to give maximum protection to the public and to 
avoid just this situation. If the County had purchased this building and made it a 
warehouse, perhaps an argument could be made that the Rule was inapplicable. 
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However, the County did buy it as a spa facility, and is running it as a health spa facility. 
The argument of the County is nothing more than form over substance. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal has been brought for the reason that the trial court's ruling 
unnecessarily removes from the public any of the protections of the Act when the 
government, and not a private individual, operates a spa facility. Such intent cannot be 
read into the Act by the Legislature. No where in the Act can it be said that the 
Legislature intended to give spa users protection if it was a private individual but give 
them no protection if it was a government. It is clear that the Legislature exempted the 
government from the requirements of a bond only. The other protections of the Act 
should be afforded to all users of spa facilities. The County should be required, just like 
any other owner of a spa facility, to honor the unexptred^membership contracts. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of January, 1998. 
DukieR. Smith x /s 
Attorney for Appellant Miller 
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ADDENDUM 1 
HEALTH SPA SERVICES PROTECTION ACT 
CHAPTER 23 
HEALTH SPAS 
Compiler's Notes, - This chapter was enacted as Title 13, Chapter 22 but because of duplicate 
numbering at the 1987 session, was renumbered as Chapter 23. 
Section 
13-23-1. Short title. 
13-23-2. Definitions. 
13-23-3. Contracts for health spa services. 
13-23-4. Rescission. 
13-23-5. Registration - Bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit required -
Penalties. 
13-23-6. Exemptions from bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit requirement 
13-23-7. Enforcement - Costs and attorney's fees - Penalties. 
13-23-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Health Spa Services Protection Act" 
History: C. 1953,13-22-1, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-1. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R152-7. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability of proprietor of private gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health club for injury to 
patron,79A.LR.4th127. 
13-23-2- Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Consumer" means a purchaser of health spa services for valuable consideration. 
(2) "Division" means Division of Consumer Protection. 
(3) (a) "Health spa" means any person, partnership, joint venture, corporation, association, or 
other entity that, for a charge or fee, provides as one of its primary purposes services or facilities 
that are purported to assist patrons to improve their physical condition or appearance through 
change in weight, weight control, treatment, dieting, aerobic conditioning, strength training, or 
other exercise. It includes any establishment designated as a "reducing salon," "health spa," 
"spa," "exercise gym," "health studio," "health club," or by other similar terms. 
(b) "Health spa" does not include: 
(i) any facility operated by a licensed physician at which the physician engages in the practice 
of medicine; 
(ii) any facility operated by a health care provider, hospital, intermediate care facility, or 
skilled nursing care facility; 
(iii) any public or private school, college, or university; 
(iv) any facility owned or operated by the state or its political subdivisions; or 
(v) any facility owned or operated by the United States or its political subdivisions. 
(4) "Health spa services" means any service provided by a health spa, including athletic 
facilities, equipment, and instruction. 
History: C. 1953, 13-22-2, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 6; recompiled as C 1953,13-23-2; 
(c) 1953-1995 by Michic Butterworth, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
L. 1988, ch. 43, § 1; 1995, ch. 89, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1988 amendment, effective March 9, 1988, rewrote Subsection (3)(b)(i), 
which had read "any nonprofit organization/1 and made a minor stylistic change. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (3)(b)(i) which read "any 
exempt organization as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue code" and made related 
subsection ^designations. 
13-23-3. Contracts for health spa services, 
(1) Any contract for the sale of health spa services shall be in writing. The written contract 
shall constitute the entire agreement between the consumer and the health spa. 
(2) The health spa shall provide the consumer with a fully completed copy of the contract at 
the time of its execution. The copy shall show: 
(a) the date of the transaction; 
(b) the name and address of the health spa; and 
(c) the name, address, and telephone number of theconsumer. 
(3) A contract may not have a term in excess of 36 months, but the contract may provide that 
the consumer may exercise an option to renew the term after its expiration. Except for a lifetime 
membership sold prior to May 1,1995, a health spa may not offer a lifetime membership. 
(4) The contract or an attachment to it shall clearly state any rules of the health spa that 
apply to the consumer's use of its facilities and services and cancellation and refund policies of 
the health spa. 
(5) The contract shall specify which equipment or facility of the health spa is omitted from 
the contract's coverage or which may be changed at the health spa's discretion. 
(6) The contract shall clearly state that the consumer has a three-day recision right provided 
in Section 13-23-4. 
History: C. 1953,13-22-3, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-3; 
1995, ch. 89, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (2)(c), the 
second sentence of Subsection (3), and Subsections (5) and (6) and made related and stylistic changes. 
13-23-4. Rescission. 
(1) A consumer may rescind a contract for the purchase of health spa services if he enters 
into the contract and gives value at a time when the health spa is not fully operational and 
available for use, and if the health spa does not become fully operational and available for use 
within 60 days after the date of the contract. 
(2) A consumer's right to rescind his contract under this section continues for three business 
days after the health spa becomes fully operational and available for use. 
(3) A consumer who rescinds his contract under this section is entitled to a refund of any 
payments he has made, less the reasonable value of any health spa services he actually received 
or $25, whichever is less. The preparation and processing of the contract and other documents are 
not considered to be health spa services that are deductible under this subsection from any 
refundable amount. 
(4) Any rescission of a contract under this section is effective upon the health spa's receipt of 
written notice of the consumer's intent to rescind the contract. The notice may be delivered by 
hand or mailed by certified mail postmarked no later than midnight of the third day after the 
health spa becomes fully operational and available for use. 
(c) 1953-1995 by Michic Butterworth, a division of Rccd Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
History: C. 1953, 13-22-4, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-4. 
13-23-5, Registration - Bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit required -
Penalties* 
(1) (a) (i) It is unlawful for any health spa facility to operate in this state unless the facility is 
registered with the division. 
(ii) Registration is effective for one year. If the health spa facility renews its registration, the 
registration shall be renewed at least 30 days prior to its expiration. 
(iii) The division shall provide by rule for the form, content, application process, and renewal 
process of the registration. 
(b) Each health spa registering in this state shall designate a registered agent for receiving 
service of process. The registered agent shall be reasonably available from 8 a.m. until 5 p.m. 
during normal working days. 
(c) The division shall charge and collect a fee for registration under guidelines provided in 
Section 63-38-3.2. 
(2) (a) Each health spa shall obtain and maintain: 
(i) a performance bond issued by a surety authorized to transact surety business in this state; 
(ii) an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a financial institution authorized to do business in 
this state; or 
(iii) a certificate of deposit. 
(b) The bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit shall be payable to the division for the 
benefit of any consumer who incurs damages as the result of: 
(i) the health spa's violation of this chapter; or 
(ii) as the result of the health spa's going out of business or relocating and failing to offer an 
alternate location within ten miles. 
(c) The division may recover from the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit the costs 
of collecting and distributing funds under this section, up to 10% of the face value of the bond, 
letter of credit, or certificate of deposit but only if the consumers have fully recovered their 
damages first. The total liability of the issuer of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit 
may not exceed the amount of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit. The health spa 
shall maintain a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit in force for one year after it 
notifies the division in writing that it has ceased all activities regulated by this chapter. 
(d) A health spa providing services at more than one location shall comply with the 
requirements of Subsection (2)(a) for each separate location. 
(e) The division may impose a fine against a health spa that fails to comply with the 
requirements of Subsection (2)(a) of up to $100 per day that the health spa remains out of 
compliance. All penalties received shall be deposited into the Consumer Protection Education 
and Training Fund created in Section 13-2-8. 
(3) The minimum principal amount of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit 
required under Subsection (2) shall be based on the number of unexpired contracts for health spa 
services to which the health spa is a party, in accordance with the following schedule: 
Principal Amount of Number of Contracts 
Bond, Letter of Credit, with an Unexpired Term 
or Certificate of Deposit Exceeding 90 Days 
$15,000 500 or fewer 
35,000 501 to 1,500 
50,000 1,501 to 3,000 
75,000 3,001 or more 
(4) Each health spa shall obtain the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit and furnish 
a certified copy of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit to the division prior to 
(c) 1953-1995 by Michie Butterworth, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
selling, offering or attempting to sell, soliciting the sale of, or becoming a party to any contract to 
provide health spa services. A health spa is considered to be in compliance with this section only 
if the proof provided to the division shows that the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit is 
current. 
(5) Each health spa shall maintain accurate records of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate 
of credit and of any payments made, due, or to become due to the issuer and shall open the 
records to inspection by the division at any time during normal business hours. 
(6) If a health spa changes ownership, ceases operation, discontinues facilities, or relocates 
and fails to offer an alternate location within ten miles within 30 days after its closing, the health 
spa is subject to the requirements of this section as if it were a new health spa coming into being 
at the time the health spa changed ownership. The former owner may not release, cancel, or 
terminate the owner's liability under any bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit previously 
filed with the division, unless: 
(a) the new owner has filed a new bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit for the 
benefit of consumers covered under the previous owner's bond, letter of credit, or certificate of 
deposit; or 
(b) the former owner has refunded all unearned payments to consumers. 
(7) If a health spa ceases operation or relocates and fails to offer an alternative location 
within ten miles, the health spa shall provide the division with 45 days prior notice. 
History: C. 1953,13-22-5, enacted by L. 1987, ch, 105, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-5; 
L. 1991, ch. 128, § 1; 1995, ch. 89, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection (1) added the 
phrase beginning "or as the result" at the end of the second sentence and added the next-to-last 
sentence; and substituted the language ending "the health spa is subject" for "A change in the ownership 
of a health spa subjects the health spa" in the first sentence in the introductory paragraph of Subsection 
(5). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsections (1), (2)(a)(iii), (2)(d), (2)(e), and (7), 
and the last sentence in Subsection (2)(d); substituted "ten miles" for "15 miles" in Subsections (2)(b)(ii) 
and (6); inserted "or certificate of deposit' after "letter of credit" throughout the section; increased the 
dollar amounts and several of the contract figures in the schedule in Subsection (3); inserted "discontinues 
facilities" in Subsection (6); and made numerous related and other stylistic changes. 
13-23-6. Exemptions from bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit requirement 
A health spa which offers no paid-in-full membership, but only memberships paid for by 
installment contracts is exempt from the application of Section 13-23-5 if: 
(1) each contract contains the following clause: "If this health spa ceases operation and fails 
to offer an alternate location within ten miles, no further payments under this contract shall be 
due to anyone, including any purchaser of any note associated with or contained in this 
contract"; 
(2) all payments due under each contract, including down payments, enrollment fees, 
membership fees, or any other payments to the health spa, are in equal monthly installments 
spread over the entire term of the contract; and 
(3) the term of each contract is clearly stated and is not capable of being extended. 
History: C. 1953,13-22-6, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-6; 
L. 1991, ch. 128, § 2; 1995, ch. 89, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the former 
introductory language as part of Subsection (1), inserted the introductory language in Subsection (2), and 
made related changes. 
(c) 1953-1995 by Michic Butterworth, a division of Rccd Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
The 1995 amendment effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (1) relating to conditions for 
exemption of a health spa from application of Section 13-23-5; redesignated the remainder of the section; 
and substituted "ten miles" for "15 miles" in Subsection (1). 
13-23-7. Enforcement - Costs and attorney's fees - Penalties. 
(1) The division may, on behalf of any consumer or on its own behalf, file an action for 
injunctive relief, damages, or both to enforce this chapter. In addition to any relief granted, the 
division is entitled to an award for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and reasonable 
investigative expenses. 
(2) (a) A person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, either by failing to 
comply with any requirement or by doing any act prohibited in this chapter, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Each day the violation is committed or permitted to continue constitutes a separate 
punishable offense. 
(b) In the case of a second offense, the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) In the case of three or more offenses, the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953,13-22-7, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 11; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-7; 
1995, ch. 89, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated the existing 
paragraph as Subsection (1), added Subsection (2), and made a stylistic change. 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
(c) 1953-1995 by Michic Butterworth, a division of Rccd Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
ADDENDUM 2 
RULE Rl 52-7 
R152-6-1 COMMERCE 
c. near the signature of the person entering into 
the consumer transaction, in bold type which is 10 
points or larger: *l UNDERSTAND THAT THIS 
CONSUMER TRANSACTION INVOLVES A 
NEGATIVE OPTION, AND THAT I MAY BE LI-
ABLE FOR PAYMENT OF FUTURE GOODS AND 
SERVICES UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS 
AGREEMENT IF I FAIL TO NOTIFY THE SUP-
PLIER NOT TO SUPPLY THE GOODS OR SER-
VICES DESCRIBED." 
1991 16-13,13-11-8,13-11-4,13-11-6 
R152-6. U t a h A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s 
A c t Rules . 
R152-6-1. Designation of Adjudicative Proceedings. 
R152-6-2. Designation of Presiding Officer. 
R152-6-1. Designation of Adjudicative Pro-
ceedings. 
A. All adjudicative proceedings within the Divi-
sion shall be informal. 
B. No hearing will be held unless specifically 
allowed or required under any laws administered by 
the Division, or by the Utah. Administrative Proce-
dures Act If a hearing is allowed, it will be held only 
if timely requested pursuant to Department Rule 
151-46b-10. 
R152-6-2. Designation of Presiding Officer. 
The presiding officer in any proceeding shall be 
the director of die division. The director may desig-
nate another person to act as presiding officer in any 
proceeding or portion thereof. 
1992 13-2-5(1) 
R152-7. U t a h H e a l t h S p a S e r v i c e s . 
R152-7-1. Authority. 
R152-7-2. Scope and Applicability. 
R152-7-3. Definitions. 
R152-7-4. Contracts for Health Spa Services. 
R152-7-5. Rescission. 
R152-7-6. Bond or Letter of Credit Required. 
RI52-7-7. Enforcement. 
R152-7-1. Authority. 
These Rules are promulgated in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 63-46a-3, and Section 13-
2-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, to pre-
scribe for the administration of the Utah Health Spa 
Act, Section 13-23-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
as amended, the "Act*. 
R152-7-2. Scope and Applicabili ty. 
These rules shall apply to the conduct of every 
Health Spa Business within the State of Utah. 
R l 52-7-3. Definitions. 
A. "Advance Sales," shall mean sales of member-
ship contracts on any date prior to the date a health 
spa facility shall be open and available to provide 
services to purchasers. 
B. "Bond" or Tetter of Credit* shall mean an 
instrument containing a promise from a third party 
to pay to the Division of Consumer Protection for the 
benefit of purchasers of membership contracts the 
dollar value of the unused portion of such purchas-
er's membership in the event the health spa facility 
shall be unable to or refuse to provide health ser-
vices pursuant to such Membership Contract. 
C. "Costs" shall mean those costs incurred by the 
Division in investigating complaints, administering-
rescission of membership contracts or fulfilling its 
responsibilities under the Utah Health Spa Act or 
Rules promulgated thereunder. 
D. "Department" shall mean the Department of 
Commerce of the State of Utah. 
E. "Division" shall mean the Division of Consumer 
Protection of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah. 
F. "Health Spa Business" shall mean the business 
of buying, operating and selling health spa facilities 
and shall include all acts related thereto. 
G. "Health Spa Facility" shall mean the physical 
facilities at which the services of a health spa 
business are provided to its members. 
H. "Member* shall mean the purchaser of a Mem-
bership contract pursuant to which the member 
anticipates receipt of health spa services in ex-
change for consideration given by such purchaser. 
I. "Membership Contract" shall mean a legally 
binding obligation pursuant to which a purchaser 
agrees to give consideration in exchange for mem-
bership privileges which the seller shall be obligated 
to provide. 
J. "Rescission" shall mean the process of canceling 
a membership contract and refunding to the pur-
chaser thereof the dollar value of the consideration 
paid for services which have not been provided as of 
the date of cancellation. 
R152-7-4. Contracts for Heal th Spa Services. 
A Prior to selling or attempting to sell a Member-
ship Contract, the following documentation must be 
filed with the Division: 
1. Name of owner(s) of the Health Spa Facility. 
2. Notice of intent to sell memberships. 
3. The original or a certified copy of the Bond or 
Letter of Credit which will secure purchaser's Mem-
bership Contract. The amount of such surety shall 
be based upon the number and cost of memberships 
offered as per Section 13-23-5(2), of the Act. 
B. Each Membership Contract shall contain a 
provision, printed in all capital letters which reads 
substantially as follows: "IN THE EVENT THE 
HEALTH SPA FACILITY CLOSES AND ANOTHER 
HEALTH SPA FACILITY OPERATED BY THE 
SELLER, OR ASSIGNS OF THE SELLER, OF 
THIS CONTRACT IS NOT AVAILABLE WITHIN A 
FIFTEEN (15) MILE RADIUS OF THE LOCATION 
THE MEMBER INTENDS TO PATRONIZE, 
SELLER WILL REFUND TO MEMBER A PRO-
RATA SHARE OF THE MEMBERSHIP COST, 
BASED UPON THE UNUSED MEMBERSHIP 
3 UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE January 1, 1995 
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TIME REMAINING ACCORDING TO THE CON-
TRACT.* 
C. All Membership Contracts sold prior to opening 
of the health spa facility shall allow the buyer a 
three (3) day right of rescission in accordance with 
Section 13-23-4 of the Act, or Section 13-ll-4<m) of 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
D. The dollar value of a Membership Contract 
shall be clearly stated on the face of the contract. 
E. In any event, no Membership Contract shall be 
sold which provides a membership term of longer 
than thirty-six (36) months. 
F. The purchaser of a Health Spa Facility shall 
replace the Seller as a party to any unexpired 
Membership Contract and shall honor all Member-
ship Contracts of the purchased facility in effect at 
the time of purchase, pursuant to Section 13-23-6(2) 
of the Act In the event a Health Spa Facility shall be 
sold under circumstances which will result in its 
closure and the purchaser shall not operate a Health 
Spa Facility within 15 miles thereof, purchaser must 
notify Members of such closure in writing within 10 
days of the date of sale. Members may cancel their 
outstanding Membership Contracts or may choose 
to continue their Membership Contract in force. 
Notice of such election shall be in writing mailed to 
the purchaser within 30 days of the receipt of notice 
of closure of the acquired Health Spa Facility. 
R152-7-5. Rescission* 
A. In the event a Health Spa Facility shall, for any 
reason, close, discontinue normal operations or oth-
erwise cease to do business while having outstand-
ing obligations to provide membership services to 
members holding valid membership contracts, the 
Health Spa Facility must offer, in writing, to rescind 
all such membership contracts and to refund the 
unused portion of all Member's membership fees. 
Such written offer of rescission shall establish the 
procedure and time limit for acceptance of the re-
scission offer and obtaining the desired refund. 
B. An offer of rescission shall be made to each 
purchaser whose Membership Contract is valid on 
the last day the Health Spa Facility is open for 
business. The Health Spa Facility shall provide the 
Division with a list of Membership Contracts valid 
on the date of closure within 10 business days of 
such closure. 
C. Money to be refunded to members upon closure 
of a Health Spa Facility under these Rules shall be 
placed in escrow with a bank or other financial 
institution previously approved by the Division. 
Such funds shall come from a Bond or Letter of 
Credit payable to the Division. 
D. Refunds shall be made to Members who submit 
claims within a time period to be prescribed by the 
Division. Such refunds shall be made under the 
supervision of the Division and shall, if insufficient 
funds are available for full refund, be made on a 
prorata basis based upon the full amount due a 
claimant The amount due shall be determined by 
multiplying the number of months remaining on 
claimant's membership term as of the date of closure 
by the monthly cost of such membership to the 
member at the time of purchase. Periods of less than 
a full month shall be compensated by determining a 
daily cost of membership and multiplying such daily 
cost by the number of unused membership days in 
such period. 
E. Refunds shall be made to claimants within 90 
days following the final date for submission of claims 
in accordance with the procedures specified above. 
F. The Division may recover from the funds depos-
ited in escrow pursuant to this Rule, its costs, 
including investigative costs, processing costs, attor-
neys fees and other expenses related to administra-
tion of rescissions made under these rules. 
G. In the event there shall be funds remaining 
after full refund to all claimant* and payment of 
costs of the Division, such excess shall be returned to 
Owners of the Health Spa Facility. 
R152-7-6. Bond or Letter of Credit Required. 
A. Except as provided in Section 13-23-6, of the 
Act, all Health Spa Facilities shall be covered by a 
performance Bond or Letter of Credit payable to the 
Division in an amount to be determined by the 
number and cost of membership contracts sold by 
the Health Spa Facility. 
B. Originals or certified copies of such Bonds or 
Letters of Credit shall be provided to the Division 
not less than 10 days in advance of the first sale or 
attempt to sell made by any Health Spa Facility. 
Annual renewals of such Bonds or Letters of Credit 
shall be filed with the Division at least 30 days in 
advance of expiration of existing Bonds or Letters of 
Credit 
C. The Division shall have the right to approve or 
reject Bonds or Letters of Credit submitted in com* 
pliance with this Rule. In the event a Bond or Letter 
of Credit is rejected by the Division, the Health Spa 
Facility shall submit another within 15 days follow* 
ing notice by the Division. In no event shall a Health 
Spa Facility conduct business without a Bond or 
Letter of Credit in effect 
D. A Health Spa Facility which allows Bonds or 
Letters of Credit to expire without filing renewal as 
provided herein, may be allowed, at the discretion of 
the Division, to register as a new Health Spa Facil-
ity pursuant to the provisions of R152-7-4 and 
R152-7-6, hereof! 
R152-7-7. Enforcement 
A. The Division may be entitled to recover costs, 
including investigative costs, processing costs, attor-
neys fees and other costs incurred in administration 
of these rules. Upon election of the parties, payment 
of such costs shall be made from the proceeds of the 
Bond or Letter of Credit 
B. Any payment made to the Division shall be 
approved by the Executive Director of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 
1990 63-46a-3, 13*2-5,13-23-1, et seq. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Third Judicial District 
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, Bar No. 1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801)366-0310 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through the 
DIVISION OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BOYD L. JENTZSCH dba QUEST 
SPORT & FITNESS, et al. 
Defendants. 
DAVID W. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950906098AA 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 10, 1997 on the 
motions for summary judgment filed concurrently by the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
JUN 2,1997 
1 ,1 9» ".* 
fjk **J> « i * -V-£ n*. 
and David W. Miller. Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, appeared for and on 
behalf of the State of Utah. Brendan P. McCullagh, Special Deputy County Attorney, 
appeared for and on behalf of Salt Lake County. Duane R. Smith, appeared on behalf of 
David W. Miller and also on behalf of the defendants, Homestead Insurance Company and 
International Special Events & Recreation Association. Boyd L. Jentzsch was also present. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
After reviewing the file, including the Stipulation filed with the Court on November 
13, 1996, and the respective motions, memoranda, and affidavits of the parties, the Court 
hereby finds that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. From a time prior to January 1, 1993 until January 3, 1995, Boyd L. Jentzsch 
("Jentzsch") d.b.a. Quest Sport & Fitness operated a health spa located at approximately 
10300 South Redwood Road, South Jordan, State of Utah.1 
2. On or about August 10, 1994, Jentzsch signed and submitted to the Utah Division 
of Consumer Protection (the "Division"), an application for a permit to operate a health spa 
at 10300 South Redwood Road in South Jordan, Utah.2 
'Memorandum in Support of Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment ("County Memo"), 
p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, f 1); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Miller Memo"), p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, HI). 
2Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("State 
Memo"), p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, If 1). 
3. The Health Spa Permit Application identified Jentzsch as the owner of the health 
spa facility operating under the name of Quest Sport & Fitness (hereinafter referred to as 
"Quest").3 
4. Neither Quest nor Jentzsch owned the facility located at 10300 South Redwood 
Road, South Jordan, Utah wherein Quest provided health spa services to its members (the 
"facility").4 
5. The facility was owned by the Country Court House Trust who leased the same 
to Quest "for the purpose of conducting thereon the business of a health club and for 
incidental purposes related thereto . . . ."5 
6. Quest did not have any interest in the facility other than as a lessee thereof.6 
7. The Division required Quest to obtain and provide to the Division a bond in the 
sum of $50,000.00 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1990).7 
8. On or about September 21, 1994, Jentzsch submitted to the Division a Contractual 
Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement to serve as a bond under the Health 
Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-23-1 (1991).8 
3State Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ^2). 
4State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, %3); County Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ^2). 
5County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1f3); State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1[4). See also Miller Memo, 
p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1(5). 
6State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, <[5); see also County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, T[4) 
7Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1f2); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, %5). 
8State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1[6). 
HHl 
9. The Contractual Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bond") identifies Boyd Jentzsch (dba) Quest Sport & Fitness 
as the "participating member" and identifies the defendants, Homestead Insurance Company 
and International Special Events and Recreation Association (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Homestead"), as the insurers.9 
10. The Bond was effective for a term of one year, beginning on August 10, 1994, 
and required Homestead to pay to the Division up to $50,000.00 in the event of a default by 
Jentzsch of his obligations under the Health Spa Services Protection Act.10 
11. In order to secure the Bond, Homestead required Quest to obtain the personal 
guarantee of an individual acceptable to Homestead, which, in this case, was David W. 
Miller.11 
12. Accordingly, David W. Miller executed a personal guarantee and indemnity 
in order to allow the Bond to be issued.12 
13. With the Bond in place, Quest sold prepaid membership contracts to 
consumers.13 
9State Memo, pp. 3-4 (Uncontested Facts, f7). 
,0State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, [^8). 
"Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f3); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, [^6). 
,2MilIer Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f4). 
l3County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f7). 
14. Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased to do 
business on or about January 3, 1995 by virtue of actions taken by the bankruptcy trustee in 
In re Quest Sport & Fitness, Inc., Case No. 93-23701.14 
15. At the time Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased 
to do business on January 3, 1995, there existed and there now exists no less than $50,000.00 
in outstanding obligations to Quest members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts 
for health spa services.15 
16. The unexpired membership contracts at the time of closure were, for the most 
part, one-year memberships with a few memberships extending no more than three years.16 
17. As a result of actions taken in the bankruptcy case, Quest members were denied 
further access to the health spa facility.17 
18. Quest did not provide an alternate location to Health Spa members holding 
valid, unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.18 
14State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f9); County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f 10); see also Stipulation, 
1f 1 (filed with the Third District Court on November 13, 1996). Compare Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f6) 
and County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, ^8) with State's Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to 
David W. Miller's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2 (Statement of Contested Facts, 1fl). 
|SState Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, If 10); Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, f7). See County Memo, 
p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, Tf9); see also Stipulation, 1f 2 (filed with the Third District Court on November 13, 1996). 
l6Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, Tf 10). 
17County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f 11). 
l8State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, 1[13). 
19. Within one week after closure of Quest, the Division notified Homestead, both 
verbally and in writing, of Quest's default under the Act, which notification included a letter 
dated January 6, 1995 and received on January 9, 1995.19 
20. The Division has made demand upon Homestead to pay $50,000.00, payable 
on a pro rata basis, to the holders of the unexpired membership contracts.20 
21. Neither Quest nor Homestead has submitted any funds for the purpose of 
refunding the unused portion of membership fees paid by Quest members holding valid, 
unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.21 
22. The Country Court House Trust sold the facility to Salt Lake County on or 
about June 15, 1995 after which Salt Lake County reopened the facility and provided the 
same services as had been provided by Quest.22 
23. There are no references to health spa membership contracts in the purchase 
agreement between the Country Court House Trust and Salt Lake County.23 
24. Salt Lake County has not filed a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit 
with the Division nor has the Division required Salt Lake County to do so.24 
l9State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, fl 1). 
20Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, %9). 
21
 State's Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, f 12). 
22County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1fl[l2-l3); State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, ^[14); Miller Memo, 
p 4, (Uncontested Facts, 1(8). 
23County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, If 14). 
24County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 115); State Memo, p 5 (Uncontested Facts, f 15). 
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II. DECISION OF THE COURT. 
Given the foregoing undisputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party, the Court concludes that there are no material issues of fact in 
dispute and that the State of Utah and Salt Lake County are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Therefore, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment of the State of Utah 
and of Salt Lake County and denies the motion for summary judgment of David W. Miller. 
The Court's decision is based on the following grounds: 
(1) The Bond submitted by Quest and issued by Homestead satisfies the 
requirements of Section 13-23-5(3) of the Act and was a valid, enforceable bond at the 
time of Quest's closure. 
(2) Quest's closure on or about January 3, 1995 and the absence of an alternate 
health spa facility operated by Quest or its assigns within a 15-mile radius of the facility 
created an obligation upon Quest to refund the unused portion of membership fees to all 
members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time of closure. 
Utah Admin. R152-7-4 (1990). 
(3) The State is entitled to recover from Homestead the full amount on the 
Bond ($50,000.00) by virtue of Quest's failure to refund the unused portion of membership 
fees to all members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time 
of closure. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991); Utah Admin. R152-7-5.C (1990). 
Mm 
(4) Rule 152-7-4.F of the Utah Administrative Code does not impose upon Salt 
Lake County an obligation to honor the membership contracts of Quest in effect at the time 
of the purchase of the facility on June 15, 1995 for the following reasons: 
(a) By definition, Salt Lake County is exempt from operation of the Act under 
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 13-23-2 which provides that a health 
spa does not include "any facility owned or operated by the state or its political 
subdivisions." Utah Code Ann. §13-23-2(3)(b)(iv) (1991); 
(b) Because administrative regulations may not extend beyond the scope of a 
statute, the rules promulgated under the Act, Utah Admin. R152-7-1 et. seq. 
(1990), are invalid to the extent they appear to impose obligations upon Salt Lake 
County as a political subdivision of the State; 
(c) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the 
Act, Salt Lake County would not be required to assume the unexpired membership 
contracts of Quest because Rule 152-7-4.F requires that the purchaser of the facility 
replace "the Seller as a party to any unexpired Membership Contract;" the seller 
in this case, however, was the Country Court House Trust, not Quest; 
(d) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the 
Act, under Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5(5) (1991), Homestead was not released from 
its obligation under the Bond by virtue of the sale of the facility because (1) Quest 
8 
had not refunded all unearned payments to consumers, and (2) Salt Lake County did 
not file a new bond or letter of credit; and 
(e) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the 
Act, because the purchase of the facility occurred a full five (5) months after its 
closure, the regulations governing closure of a facility applied rather than the 
regulations governing the purchase of a facility. 
JUDGMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Bond is forfeited and the plaintiff, State of Utah, is hereby 
awarded judgment against Homestead in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) for 
the benefit of former Quest members who incurred damages as the result of Quest's going 
out of business and subsequent failure to refund to its members the unused portion of their 
membership fees. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991). 
Judgment is also awarded to defendants, State of Utah and Salt Lake County, 
against plaintiff, David W. Miller, whose complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this # day of May, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: A ' x H ^ y 
9 
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ly for Davia WTMiller, Homestead Insurance 
Company, and the International Special Events 
& Recreation Association 
BrendarTP. McCu 
Attorney for 
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THE COURT: All right. I've considered these 
various motions, and it is not disputed that there are no 
material issues of fact in dispute and that the issues 
presented to the Court are matters wholly related to law 
and not fact. I will then incorporate in this ruling, of 
course, the undisputed facts, and I won't reiterate those 
now. 
This turns on the analysis of the statutes, 
Section 13-23-1 et seq. , I believe — or it may start at 
2 — and the various specific provisions of the act that 
are argued in the briefs. There are also rules that have 
been established that also have been briefed. 
I would say, from the outset, that — obviously, 
the standard that must be applied is that the — there 
may — in summary judgment, there may be no disputed issues 
of fact that are material and the moving party must show, 
as a matter of law, that he or she or it is entitled to 
prevail. And all reasonable inferences must be drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party. 
This is a — Mr. Jentzsch did not file a motion. 
He is a dba for an entity against whom summary judgment has 
been filed. His arguments are essentially in line with the 
arguments presented by David Miller and the bonding 
WW 
company, but some comments go beyond the scope of the 
issues raised in the pleadings. 
And to that extent, although I've granted some 
oral argument, what is before the Court are written 
documents. Those are actually the arguments of record. I 
have considered, though, all of the arguments that have 
been presented to the Court and I am prepared to rule at 
this time. And I — when Mr. Smith stated that counsel for 
the State and County are not giving life to the statute and 
that the rule, obviously, is in line with what the overall 
tenet of the statute is, it must be remembered, of course, 
that neither counsel nor the Court can breath life into any 
statute that the Legislature has not already put there. 
And the first analysis is whether the relevant 
applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous. If they are 
clear and unambiguous, that is the end of the discussion. 
It is Hornbook law, of course, to note that administrative 
rules which are adopted, promulgated and adopted to 
effectuate the statutes, must be within the bounds of the 
statute. Otherwise, they are unenforceable. They only 
have — there's only authority invested in an 
administrative entity to adopt rules that lie within the 
bounds of the statute giving the entity the authority to 
act in the first place. 
So is the statute regarding what a health spa is 
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and whose — the definition, if you will, of health spa. 
It is stated specifically in the statute that a health spa 
does not include, (iv), "any facility owned or operated by 
the state or its political subdivisions.11 
Now, first, it is undisputed that Salt Lake 
County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
The State of Utah is a plaintiff in this action also. This 
is a very clear, very plain, very unambiguous provision of 
law and simply it clearly exempts the State and the County 
from falling under the definition of those who are 
operating a health spa — well, at least consistent with 
this statutory provision. 
There is nothing else in the act itself that 
gives rise to a claim that the State and County are 
obligated to comply with the filing of bonds, letters of 
credit and so forth. And, certainly, governmental entities 
have a unique relationship vis-a-vis their consumers than 
does a private owner, be it a corporation or an individual 
or otherw i s e. 
I think we can safely assume that the State and 
its political subdivisions are around and they are 
locatable and they're not going to pack up and go away. 
And there is a significant distinction that the Legislature 
could clearly make between operators of such facilities and 
the State and its political subdivisions. 
5 
It seems to me that the rule which has been 
adopted cannot be — cannot exceed what the Legislature's 
restrictions have been. And to the extent that this rule 
appears to do so, it is invalid. And that's not putting 
the blinders on, that's just following the controlling 
rules of statutory construction I and other entities are 
compelled to follow and apply. 
I am persuaded by each and every argument of the 
State and the County in this case. It seems to me it is 
clear that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
And, accordingly, I grant the motions for summary judgment 
of the State and of the County and deny the motion for 
summary judgment of Mr. Miller and by the entities. 
Mr. Jentzsch has not filed a motion, and so there 
is no motion to grant or deny there. But, obviously, this 
constitutes a ruling against him as a matter of law, since 
he is the dba for this entity. 
Now, is there any — I would also note, and it's 
not disputed either, I note, by Mr. Miller that the County 
was not a purchaser of this facility. Even if it otherwise 
could possibly be read as that, it cannot be because, well, 
first, it's undisputed that it's not, but the reason that 
it's undisputed that it's not a purchaser is because the 
facility was closed a full five months or so before the 
County entered into its acquisition of the property. 
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MR. SMITH: Your Honor, if I may interrupt, I 
believe that is, indeed, the dispute. If they are found to 
be a purchaser of the facility, then the rule would apply. 
Is the Court making a ruling that the rule is invalid? 
THE COURT: I said, to the extent the ruling of 
the Court is to go beyond the clear and unambiguous 
statutory provision, it is invalid. 
MR. SMITH: I was just asking for a 
clarification. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. All right. Are there any 
questions about the Court's ruling? 
MR. SMITH: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I presumed 
not, since you finished talking. 
MR. SMITH: Sure. Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: I'd like — let's see, let's have 
Mr. McCullagh prepare an order pertaining to the Court's 
ruling in this matter. And I appreciate the thoroughness 
with which this has been presented, and I thank you one and 
all. 
MR. GRAY: Your Honor, I'll go ahead and prepare 
that, if that's okay. 
THE COURT: You will, Mr. Gray? 
MR. GRAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Then you may do so. 
(Requested portion of transcript completed.) 
* * * * * 
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